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Abstract
Why do adolescents take risks? What is the appropriate response to adolescent
risk-taking? This Commentary for a special issue of Developmental Review, discussing a
set of papers in that issue, explores these questions with attention to changes in the
adolescent brain, to dual-processing theory, to social influences, and to fuzzy-trace
theory. It contends that adolescent risk-taking is often driven by the social meaning of
risk and caution, and that social meaning operates as a tax on or a subsidy to behavior.
Changes in social meaning present a serious collective action problem, but also a
valuable opportunity for both law and policy.

Adolescents take many risks; they drink, use drugs, have unsafe sex, smoke
cigarettes, and drive recklessly. Much of the time, adolescent risk-taking leads to
seriously impaired lives and even premature deaths. For public policy, it is indispensable
to know why adolescents take (unwise) risks, and also to know what kinds of policies
will steer young people in good directions.
In many fields, including law, it has become common to distinguish between two
families of cognitive operations, often called System 1 and System II (see Gerrard et al.,
this issue, for an overview). System I is faster, simpler, and more intuitive, and it reflects
the use of heuristics. When people are automatically afraid of flying in airplanes and
large dogs, and when they are tempted to kiss an attractive stranger or to eat a large piece
of chocolate cake, System I is at work. System II is slower and more effortful, and it
approaches problems in a more analytical fashion. System II might suggest that airplane
travel and large dogs are unlikely to be dangerous, and that it might be best to get to
know the stranger first and to avoid chocolate cake. In the domain of risk-taking
behavior, it seems natural to think that adolescents are especially influenced by System 1,
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and that their System II is ill-developed or impotent. When teenagers drive too fast,
smoke cigarettes, or engage in unsafe sex, System I might seem to be the culprit.
But these statements raise many questions. What, exactly, are Systems I and II?
Do they have physical locations in the brain, or are they themselves heuristics or mere
metaphors? Is intuitive thinking always inferior to the more analytical kind? Experienced
lawyers and engineers often rely on their intuitions; young lawyers and engineers operate
more analytically, in a way that can produce worse decisions, not better ones. Perhaps
older people have well-developed intuitive systems, steering them away from unwise
risks; perhaps adolescent risk-taking is driving by an absence of (good) heuristics. And
when people take risks, or refuse to take risks, it is often because of the social meaning of
risk-taking -- of the social signals that are sent by their behavior. But social meaning is
not constant; it varies across persons, groups, and time.
The essays in this issue offer fascinating perspectives on these questions. In this
Commentary, I offer brief discussions of the neurobiological perspective offered by two
of the papers and the more broadly cognitive approaches offered by the three others. I
conclude with a few remarks on the topic of social meaning. I suggest that an
understanding of meaning and its malleability helps to supplement the picture of
adolescent risk-taking – and also suggests some tools that policymakers might use if they
seek to move adolescents in better directions.
The Teenage Brain
Might adolescent risk-taking have something to do with the development of the
adolescent brain? Laurence Sternberg thinks so. He offers a neurobiological perspective
on adolescent behavior, based on a distinction between two brain systems. His key claim
is that at the time of puberty, teenagers seek greater rewards, above all because of
changes in the brain’s dopaminergic system (which we might understand as System I).
That system, the “socio-emotional system,” includes the amygdala, nucleus accumbens,
medial prefrontal cortex, superior temporal cortex, and other regions of the brain that are
associated with judgments of attractiveness, recognition of relevant stimuli (such as
faces), and other forms of “social processing.” As adolescents grow into adults, the
cognitive control system (System II) improves, so that people can engage in better self-
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regulation. For adolescents, the problem is the different timetables of the relevant
changes – with an early and abrupt increase in sensation-seeking and reward-seeking,
alongside a slower increase in people’s ability to engage in self-regulation.
Sternberg offers a great deal of evidence in support of his general conclusion.
Changes in neural oxytocin at puberty suggest that as compared with children and adults,
adolescents will be highly responsive to social and emotional stimuli. People’s scores on
scales involving risk preference and sensation-seeking jump from the age of ten until
mid-adolescence and decline thereafter. It is at the time of adolescence that the scores are
increasing rapidly, while scores on impulse control are increasing slowly.
Sternberg also emphasizes the important fact that adolescent risk-taking is
especially likely to occur in groups. His own experimental evidence, involving driving
decisions, found that the presence of friends actually doubled risk-taking by adolescents
(while having no effect on adults). The neurobiological explanation is that peers activate
the neural circuitry that is involved in reward processing, and this activation increases
sensation-seeking.
As people become older, risk-taking decreases. One reason may be that further
changes in the dopaminergic system may lead to greater caution; another reason, and
Sternberg’s preferred account, is that higher-level cognition, including the lateral
prefrontal and parietal association cortices, develops and imposes a check. As teenagers
become young adults, the cognitive control system matures; connections within the brain
increase coordination between cognition and affect; and developmental changes may
reduce reward-seeking. Resistance to peer influence can be explained in this way. Such
resistance is produced, in Sternberg’s view, by cognitive control of more impulsive risktaking behavior.
In this light, Sternberg is not surprised that educational programs often have so
little effect in reducing adolescent risk-taking. The problem is not what adolescents
know, but what they do. Indeed, adolescents often know plenty. They have relevant
information about relevant risks. They act recklessly not because they are ill-informed,
but because their dopaminergic system is developing more rapidly than their cognitive
control system. Sternberg goes so far as to suggest an evolutionary explanation for the
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asymmetry, because natural selection would favor preservation of an inclination to take
risks at the time of adolescence, which is when sexual reproduction starts.
In Sternberg’s view, increased risk-taking by adolescents “is likely to be
normative, biologically driven, and, to some extent, inevitable.” The developmental shift
that occurs at puberty cannot be prevented. Sternberg’s account, and his own apparent
pessimism, raise an obvious puzzle: What are the best ways to help teenagers to avoid
recklessness?
B.J. Casey, Sarah Getz, and Adriana Galvan also attempt to explain suboptimal
adolescent decisions in biological terms. In their view, the problem lies in a lack of
impulse control, produced by a relatively developed limbic reward system and a
relatively undeveloped top-down control system. Adolescent risk-taking is not adequately
characterized as a lack of control; if it were, young children would be taking plenty of
risks, because they would have the least self-control of all. Building on rodent models,
Caset, Getz, and Galzan argue that the problem for adolescents is that the limbic system
is developing quite rapidly while the control system is not. Risk-taking behavior in
adolescence may well follow from this developmental difference.
Casey, Getz, and Galvcan invoke fMRI studies to establish this difference. During
risky choices, increases in subcortical activation are exaggerated for adolescents as
compared to adults. Like Sternberg, Casey, Getz, and Galvcan even suggest a possible
evolutionary explanation for why the systems mature at a different pace: Adolescence is a
time when people need to be able to leave their families and villages, which is risky, in
order to find a mate. Seeking novelty, and taking risks, may be rewarded by having an
opportunity to have children.
This analysis is extremely close to that offered by Sternberg. If the general
account is correct, we have a simple and quite striking explanation of why teenagers are
especially likely to take risks. But it is obvious that some teenagers run risks that others
are able to avoid, and that different periods reflect different “waves” of enthusiasm for
certain kinds of risky behavior. In some times and places, many teenagers use cocaine; in
other times and places, cocaine has no appeal at all. Culture matters; so does the social
meaning of certain risks. An obvious challenge is to bring the neurobiological evidence in
contact with heterogeneity in risk-taking behavior among teenagers and over time.
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Fuzzy Trace Theory and Dual Processing
Susan Rivers, Valerie Reyna, and Britain Mills attempt to explain adolescent risktaking by reference to fuzzy-trace theory. The key idea here is that people’s decisions are
based on simple mental representations of the “gist” of social situations, rather than on
more quantitative or detailed information. What matters, on this view, is the meaning of
the information, rather than verbatim details or statistical analysis. Their most striking
claim is that adults and experts engage in gist-based reasoning, and that adolescents often
go wrong because they are unable to do so, or to do so well.
Rivers, Reyna, and Mills invoke empirical findings to the effect to that people’s
decisions are a product of the gist, that reliance on gist-based proceeding actually
increases with development, and that when people rely on such processing, they are less
likely to engage in unhealthy risk-taking. They contend, and refer to a great deal of
evidence to show, that the two different kinds of representations – gist-based vs. verbatim
and more detailed – are actually stored separately in the brain and are retrieved
independently. As people grow older, they shift away from quantitative, analytic
processing, and toward more simplified representations of information. For example,
doctors are specialists, and one might think that they would avoid simple processing; but
in fact their method of processing information is both cruder and more accurate than that
of those with less experience. More generally, development involves a greater reliance on
simplified representations of information and a shift away from more analytical,
quantitative processing relying on verbatim facts. In short, advanced reasoning “reflects
the fuzzy processes of intuition.”
How do adolescents fit into this picture? Rivers, Reyna, and Mills urge that
adolescents operate at multiple levels, teetering between complex weighing of pros and
cons on the one hand and gist-based intuition on the other. For example, adolescents
might think hard about whether (a) to confess to skipping school and risk punishment or
(b) to refuse to confess and risk being found out. A more mature person, focused on the
gist, would go to class and avoid both options.
Rivers, Reyna, and Mill emphasize the importance of emotion to people’s
decisions. What people choose is often influenced by the “valence,” positive or negative,
of a stimulus. With people, activities, and products, human beings frequently have a
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rapid, intuitive, affective reaction, and that reaction may determine the ultimate course of
action (Slovic et al., 2002). A decision whether to screen for prostate cancer is influenced
by the valence of the screening, and factual information may not much affect the valence.
Experience, by contrast, can create a “knowledge store” that produces a negative or
positive valence. Teenage smoking can be understood in this light. The bad consequences
of smoking are not much associated with the behavior, and the meaning of smoking – as
fun, exciting, and social – is what affects behavior. It should not be surprising in this light
that emotional arousal can overwhelm efforts to engage in self-regulation.
Rivers, Reyna, and Mills believe that their approach has important implications
for public policy. For example, it would be possible to alter the gist of risk stimuli, not by
providing information, but by suggesting a negative valence. If the goal is to stop
teenagers from smoking, it might be best to cue a negative gist, rather than to provide
detailed information about the health risks. Similarly, steps might be taken to educate
adolescents’ intuitions -- for example by helping them to make an automatic connection
between a bad situation and risk avoidance. If alcohol abuse has an automatic negative
valence, we should expect teenagers not to abuse alcohol.
Meg Gerrard, Frederick Gibbons, Amy Houlihan, Michelle Stock, and Elizabeth
Pomery offer a dual-process approach, specifically focused on health-related decisions.
Building on the conventional distinction between System I and System II, while also
referring to other approaches (including fuzzy-trace theory), their distinctive contribution
lies in their emphasis on the importance of “risk prototypes” to adolescent behavior. The
prototype model finds two paths to adolescent risk behavior. The first is reasoned and
analytic; the second is based on images and heuristic processing. According to Gerrard et
al., the social reaction path helps to explain apparently unintended behavior by
adolescents, in particular their unplanned decisions to engage in risky behavior.
Gerrard et al. contend that much of adolescent behavior is unplanned and in a
sense even unintentional. In so contending, they point to the fact that adolescents say that
they do not intend to engage in self-destructive behavior, even if they end up doing so.
Their behavior is ultimately a product of “image-based decision-making.” Certain
favorable images, or prototypes, attract corresponding behavior, including smoking and
drinking; these images involve the prototypical smoker or driver. The more favorable the
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image, the more likely it is that teenagers will engage in the relevant activity. Feelings of
personal invulnerability also matter a great deal. Adolescents may know, in the abstract,
that it is dangerous to drink and drive, without knowing that they personally are at risk if
they drink and drive.
Gerard et al. offer considerable evidence that the analytic system operates
consciously, whereas the image-based system works outside of explicit awareness. They
also show that prototypes have emphatically social roots. Media presentations, the
behavior of friends, and parental behavior can affect the valence associated with various
prototypes. Some social influences appear to affect people’s conscious intentions, but do
not affect their actual behavior, because they work on the more analytic or deliberative
system. Gerard et al. urge that as people grow older, decision-making becomes more
reasoned, and the link between intention and behavior becomes stronger. As the
deliberative system imposes stronger checks, the impact of image-based processing
weakens. These points suggest possible interventions to reduce dangerous behavior by
adolescents. An obvious approach would be to work on prototypes. Gerard et al. believe
that a heuristic approach, working directly on mental images, might help to steer
teenagers in better directions.
Baruch Fischoff is interested in a different topic: the decisionmaking competence
of teenagers. Emphasizing that human beings are subject to systematic biases, he thinks
that on balance, teenagers do “surprisingly well.” In many domains, teenagers make
sensible judgments about risks, in the sense that their assessments mirror social reality. In
assessing risks, teenagers are responsive to the particulars of their own situations. For
example, those who report neighborhood gang activity give higher probabilities for being
arrested or dying in the next year. But in some cases, teenagers make serious mistakes.
Teenage girls seriously underestimate the likelihood that they will become pregnant.
Teenagers generally overestimate their risk of death in the near future – and also
exaggerate the likelihood that they will be working over twenty hours per week in the
following year.
Fischoff also finds that when asked about hard decisions, teenagers do not much
reflect on the full range of variables. Instead they tend to focus on some statement of
resolve, such as “eat more healthfully.” Fischoff urges that teenagers could be helped to
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see the range of possible options and to think better about them. Notably, Fischoff
focuses on what teenagers think, not on what they do. It is possible that teenagers have an
accurate sense of certain risks, and know fairly well how to respond to them, while also
behaving pretty recklessly. Indeed, this possibility is strongly signaled by several of the
papers in this issue.
An interesting puzzle here involves the overlapping but in some ways quite
different approaches of Rivers et al. on the one hand and Gerrard et al. on the other.
Rivers et al. think that as people mature, they become less analytic and less intuitive,
whereas Gerrard et al. believe that the opposite is true. Rivers et al. are clearly right to
suggest that experts often do have intuitions that are both rapid and highly reliable.
Compare, for example, an adult driver with a teenager driver. Because of her experience,
an adult driver can make rapid, even automatic judgments about what to do in a difficult
situation. Lacking experience, teenage drivers have to engage in the appropriate analysis,
which can lead them into trouble. The teenager may have internalized the rules and may
be capable of a careful analysis of various situations. What marks the experienced driver
is an educated intuition, ensuring judgments that are good as well as rapid. These are
points for Rivers et al.; experienced people do rely on their intuitions, and their intuitions
generally lead them in the right directions.
But we have to be careful with this point. Doctors’ intuitions are often inaccurate;
statistical analysis, based on the numbers, is significantly better (Meadow and Sunstein,
2003). Or consider the question of risk regulation in general. No one thinks that
government should make decisions about arsenic levels in drinking water or ozone levels
in the ambient air by asking for the intuitions of experts. For regulation of the risks
associated with particulate matter or acid deposition, it makes no sense to consult
heuristic-based judgments. The best approach is instead highly quantitative, based on an
analysis of the costs and benefits of various possible approaches (Sunstein, 2002). Many
doctors, lawyers, and engineers will have good intuitions about how to proceed, but at
least in hard cases, they will probably do best if they are highly deliberative and consult
not the gist but relevant facts and figures. The whole idea of evidence-based medicine is
designed to correct medical judgments that are based on heuristics that generally work
well but that also misfire. Or consider the domain of baseball, where the intuitive
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judgments of experts are far inferior to what emerges from statistical analysis (Sunstein
and Thaler, 2005).
The more particular question is whether adolescent risk-taking is typically or
generally driven by analysis or by careful examination of the costs and benefits of
engaging in certain activities. Rivers et al. convincingly show that experienced people
have and use heuristics; but they do not demonstrate that adolescents always or generally
operate as statisticians, carefully weighing quantitative evidence. When teenagers engage
in unsafe sex, abuse drugs, or drive recklessly, it is probably because they use heuristics
that misfire, are excessively optimistic, or are impulsive and lacking self-control
(especially, as Sternberg suggests, in groups). One problem is that their more deliberative
system is comparatively weak.
What Might Be Done?
The papers in this issue offer a great deal of instructive material on adolescent
risk-taking. Their emphasis, of course, is on why adolescents take risks; the policy
questions are not the primary concern. But suppose that public officials seek to promote
better decisions by adolescents – to steer them away from reckless behavior. Educational
efforts will apparently have a limited effect. As Fischoff shows, many adolescents
already have a great deal of information. A simple lesson, emerging from several of the
papers and compatible with the neuroscience, is that private and public institutions might
be able to have a significant impact if they are able to alter the social meaning of reckless
behavior.
To understand this point, we need to say a bit more about social meaning.
Consider smoking, drinking, using illegal drugs, committing violent acts, driving without
seatbelts, littering, singing in public, wearing jeans, eating too little, eating excessively.
In most settings, the social meaning operates as a kind of tax on certain behavior; it can
operate as a kind of subsidy as well. In some parts of the world, those who refuse to
drink, or who buckle their seatbelts, are taxed; in other parts of the world, the same
conduct is subsidized. Sometimes the social meaning “tax” or “subsidy” is the most
important determinant of people’s behavior. For teenagers, everything may depend, in the
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end, on whether the prevailing meaning operates as a tax or a subsidy. Even life itself
may depend on the sign and magnitude of the social meaning.
A key problem is that social meaning is not within the control of any single
individual (Lessig, 1996). Changes in social meaning require solution of a collective
action problem. Teenagers, like adults, live in accordance with social meanings for which
they are not responsible and which they may deplore. Consider, for example, the teenager
who uses drugs, or engages in criminal behavior, not because he likes doing these things,
but because failing to do so is heavily taxed by the prevailing meaning. Or consider the
teenager who takes a certain risk only because of the meaning of doing so, when that very
teenager would be willing to agree that things would be much better if the meaning were
otherwise. Often teenagers run risks because they believe that other teenagers think that it
is cowardly or pathetic to be cautious.
To put the point in terms used by Rivers et al., the most obvious remedy here is to
alter gist-based processing on the part of adolescents, in large part by working on the
“valence,” or meaning, of various options. In some times and places, smoking has
signaled a kind of daring, an indifference to convention, a willingness to follow one’s
own path. In other communities, smoking has signaled a kind of foolishness, or a
willingness to offend and even endanger others, or a capitulation to the machinations of
the cigarette companies. If teenagers’ decisions are affected by images, or prototypes, of
people who engage in the relevant behavior, then private and public institutions have a
real opportunity to provide some help. “Meaning entrepreneurs,” in the private and public
sectors, often have a real influence in altering the social meaning of risk-taking.
In the 1970s and 1980s, there was a dramatic drop in smoking among AfricanAmerican teenagers, to the point where only about 4.4% of African-American teenagers
smoked – a percentage far below the corresponding number for whites (Sunstein, 1997).
What accounts for this difference? Part of the explanation appears to lie in differing
understandings of the social meaning of smoking, which came to be seen as a “white
thing.” And part of that difference is captured by a private antismoking campaign in the
African-American community, symbolized most dramatically by posters in Harlem
subways showing a skeleton resembling the Marlboro man and lighting a cigarette for an
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African-American child. The caption read: “They used to make us pick it. Now they want
us to smoke it.”
Teenagers may be biologically inclined to take risks, but in some communities,
social pressures and prevailing meanings cut hard against (certain kinds of) risk-taking
behavior. Policymakers have a real opportunity here. They also face some practical
problems. If Nancy Reagan (or Laura Bush) tells teenagers that they should “Just Say
No” to drugs, they might be all the more inclined to say yes. If high school teachers tell
students that unsafe sex “really isn’t cool,” high school students might just roll their eyes.
(If a teenage girl’s request for the use of a condom counts as a confession or an
accusation, we might not have many requests for condom use.) Recall that individuals,
including teenagers, live with meanings that they did not construct – and that once those
meanings are place, they must live by them.
Nonetheless, communities often do find ways to change meanings, as “meaning
entrepreneurs” alter the valence associated with one or another risk-taking activity. A
major task for public policy, as well as for social science, is to investigate the processes
by which the meanings of risky behavior change over time.
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